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Abstract: Adopting an autobiographical perspective, this essay explores changes in the 
writing and teaching of history over the past eight decades through the introduction of the 
comparative dimension and the interaction of history with the social sciences. Beginning 
with a personal account of an early encounter with history as storytelling, the essay 
recounts successive exposure as an undergraduate to the comparative history of 
revolutions and later as an assistant professor at Northwestern University to contrasting 
accounts of World history and modernization theory. The analysis then centers on heated 
controversies that raised serious questions over the bias of Eurocentrism in the history 
profession. In the next stage where personal and professional intellectual development 
coincided in the nineteen sixties at the University of Pennsylvania, the role of the social 
sciences assumes a growing importance. Revisions of Marx and Weber and insights from 
the Annales School provided powerful incentives to organize interdisciplinary seminars 
and collaborative publications. The site of the third stage is the Central European 
University in Budapest. Here a re-organzation of the history faculty and the history 
curriculum introduces the comparative study of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
as three interrelated regions. At the same time, a related personal research agenda focuses 
on frontiers as an ideal spatial concept for comparative history. This leads to a broader 
understanding of the need to apply the geo-cultural approach of the Annales School to 
space outside the traditional boundaries of Europe. A research project is designed that 
combines a comparative study of three interrelated spatial components retaining similar 
features over a longue durée: the imperial rule of five continental multi-cultural societies 
sharing frontiers, re-defined as complex, and entangled in a competition to incorporate and assimilate borderlands on their peripheries. The project has produced three volumes 
commemorating a lifelong commitment to a search for historical synthesis.   
Keywords: Space; Frontiers; Comparative History. 
 
DESCOBRINDO GRANDES IMPÉRIOS CONTINENTAIS: UM HISTORIADOR EM BUSCA DE 
ESPAÇO 
Resumo: Adotando uma perspectiva autobiográfica, este ensaio explora as mudanças na 
escrita e no ensino de História nas últimas oito décadas que resultaram do uso da 
dimensão comparativa e da interação com as Ciências Sociais no campo da História. 
Começando com o relato pessoal de um encontro da história como storytelling, o ensaio 
relata minha exposição, como graduando, à história comparada das revoluções e 
posteriormente, como professor assistente da Universidade de Northwestern, às 
perspectivas contrastantes da História Mundial e da Teoria da Modernização. A análise, 
então, se concentra em acaloradas controvérsias que levantam questões sérias acerca do 
eurocentrismo na profissão de historiador. Na seção seguinte, que trata do 
desenvolvimento intelectual profissional e pessoal na Universidade da Pensilvânia nos 
anos de 1960, o papel das Ciências Sociais assume importância crescente. Revisões de 
Marx e Weber, bem como insights da Escola dos Annales, forneceram poderosos incentivos 
para organizar seminários interdisciplinares e publicações colaborativas. O espaço da ação 
                                                             
1 E-mail: riebera@ceu.edu. 
Revista de História Comparada - Programa de Pós-Graduação em História Comparada-UFRJ 
https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/RevistaHistoriaComparada - ISSN: 1981-383X 
 
Rev. hist. comp., Rio de Janeiro, v. 13, n. 1, p. 74-107, 2019. 75 
se desloca então para a Central European University, em Budapeste. Aqui, uma 
reorganização da faculdade de História e de seu currículo introduziram a pesquisa 
comparada da Europa Central, Oriental e Sudeste europeu como três regiões inter-
relacionadas. Ao mesmo tempo, uma agenda de pesquisa pessoal relacionada ao tema se 
concentra nas fronteiras espaciais como conceito ideal para a história comparada. Isso 
leva a uma compreensão ampliada da necessidade de aplicar uma abordagem geocultural 
da Escola dos Annales para além das fronteiras tradicionais da Europa. Propôs-se então 
um projeto de pesquisa que combina um estudo comparativo dos três componentes 
espaciais inter-relacionados que mantém componentes semelhantes a uma longue durée: o 
domínio imperial de cinco sociedades multi-culturais continentais que partilham 
fronteiras, redefinidas como complexas e emaranhadas em uma competição para 
incorporar e assimilar fronteiras em suas periferias. O projeto resultante produziu três 
volumes, coroando um compromisso vitalício de busca por uma síntese histórica. 




The invitation from your journal to participate in your issue on Comparative History and Social Systems  stimulated me to reflect on the long 
intellectual journey that led me to appreciate and practice comparative history. In 
the beginning, there was Crane Brinton. As an undergraduate in a course on the 
French Revolution, I came across his The Anatomy of Revolution, a pioneering work 
that still repays reading.2 Later as a graduate student living in Paris, I was struck 
by the large number and variety of memorials associated with different often 
antagonistic participants and contrasting moments in the history of the French 
revolutionary and Napoleonic years.  Only much later were my impressions given 
conceptual meaning by Pierre Nora s Les lieux de mémoires.3 At the time, however, 
in January 1956, I had the good fortune to be one of the first American students to 
visit the Soviet Union after the war; a revelatory trip reinforced two years later by 
participation in the first year of the Soviet-American student cultural exchange. 
What impressed me in Moscow by comparison with the memorialization in Paris of 
the French Revolution with all its complexities and contradictions was the absence 
of memorials to the Russian revolution with the exception of Lenin s tomb (then 
still housing Stalin). By contrast, the victory in the Second World War was 
everywhere celebrated in monumental memorials and place names. It was as if the 
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Bolshevik revolution had not only devoured its children but thoroughly digested 
them; in the empty space the Great Fatherland War, as the Russians called it, was 
allotted pride of place as the defining moment in Soviet history. Returning to Paris, 
the opposite was true as I anticipated; there the absence of memorials to the 
Second World War testified to widespread desire to forget the years marking a 
dark and dismal period in French history. This illustration of what today would be 
conceptualized as memory history brought home to me in vivid form the 
importance of time and space in comparative history. Unknowingly, I was then 
prepared for Marc Bloch and the early work of the Annales School. 
 Returning to the United States to take up teaching duties, I was still not fully 
conscious of where the path my scattered impressions were leading me. Although I 
had been trained as a Russian specialist at the Russian (now Harriman) Institute at 
Columbia, my first job obliged me to teach a variety of courses including a survey 
of Modern European History. Unlike many of my colleagues who then were 
assigned survey courses of this kind (let us recall this was the early nineteen 
sixties), I regarded the dominant narrative in most textbooks and curricula 
outlines as skewed in favor of Western Europe. (Fortunately, I only briefly had to 
teach the now much derided course called Western Civilization or, as the 
undergraduates disdainfully called it, from Plato to NATO . Reviewing my 
formative period as a historian, I recalled several fortuitous encounters with extra-
European civilizations in my earlier life. Taken together they provided me with a 
broad range of potential units of comparison that I could employ in the classroom 
and later in scholarly work.  
 First there were the travel tales of my grandfather and grandmother. Of 
German birth and education, but Americanized, they were, nonetheless intrepid 
travelers in Latin America, the Middle East, India and the Far East in the decades 
before the Second World War. They brought back objets d art of a modest but 
genuine sort and to them attached stories about the cultures from which they 
came. As an undergraduate at a small liberal arts school known for sports, the 
faculty took an interest in a student who preferred to write research papers about 
Afghanistan, Xinjiang and Manchuria that clearly devolved from my grandfather s 
tales. In graduate school at Columbia, in addition to the required courses in 
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Russian history, I had the good fortune to attend the first class taught in the West 
by the now famous historian of the Ottoman Empire, Halil Inalchik. And then 
something of a challenge checked my headlong flight from a Europe-centered 
historical outlook. The shadow of world history fell across my path. 
 
World History or Global History? 
 At Northwestern University my first permanent teaching position exposed 
me to the pioneering studies in world history launched by my colleague, Leften 
Stavrianos, and at the University of Chicago, William Hardy McNeil and Marshal J. 
S. Hodgson.  While stimulated by their work, I could not help concluding, perhaps 
unjustly, that they were still thinking in terms of how the West shaped the world, 
rather than treating extra-European civilizations in their own right. But if this was 
to be done, then the question remained: how to conceptualize an alternative 
approach?  
  McNeill, Hodgson and Stavrianos were motivated in part by their critical 
attitude toward a bi-polar concept of the postwar world (that is the Cold War), 
growing out of their early interests which were not located in the mainstream of 
West European or U.S. history.  All three began their scholarly careers by studying 
the Eastern Mediterranean, one of the most continuously dynamic regions of cross-
cultural and commercial exchange in the world. They shared a common vision of 
the world as an integrated set of regional geographies although they disagreed on most everything else. McNeill's world  was designed to show how the separate 
civilizations of Eurasia interacted from the very beginning of their history….   He found coherence and structure  in world history in the networks of 
communications and transportation and the codification of merchant law. But he 
proposed a fresh agenda that would follow two levels of human encounters along 
those networks, the first biological and ecological and the second cultural.4  McNeill s colleague at the University of Chicago, Marshall G.S. Hodgson adopted a hemispheric interregional approach,  in order to avoid the pitfalls of 
Eurocentrism that he thought weakened McNeill's work. By training an Islamicist, 
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he stressed the development of a common stock of human techniques and cultural 
resources within distinctive regions that he identified with hemispheres. While he 
acknowledged the importance of cultural borrowing, he attributed greater 
importance to the internal processes of development by drawing on religious 
traditions that stamped each civilization with its distinctive characteristics. For 
Hodgson, then, Afro-Asiatic history was a world unto its own.5 Leften Stavrianos, 
originally a specialist in the Balkans, conceived of a world that was by far the most 
culturally pluralistic. His answer to the dilemma of Eurocentrism was to give equal 
time and space to the third world where he perceived the seeds of vital renewal 
and a source of optimism for the future development of human values.6 Since then 
his predictions have turned out to have been overly optimistic. It was a sign of the 
times, that none of the three left any disciples.  
In the meantime two schools (or were they camps?) of world history were 
coming into fashion, not so much as a reaction to the Cold War as they were a part 
of it. They took as their respective points of departure a revival of interest in the 
global perspective of Karl Marx and, as a counterfoil, that of Max Weber. For these 
two powerful social thinkers the guiding idea of global history was not spatial but 
situated in a process of becoming modern. Their major re-interpreters in Western 
scholarship were the founders of theories of dependency and modernization. In 
greatly simplified terms, it would not be wholly inaccurate to define the magnetic 
poles around which they fashioned their world processes as the rationalization of 
power (military technology, bureaucracy, financial organization) and the 
rationalization of the economy (commercial expansion, industrial growth, 
entrepreneurial spirit). As might have been expected, there were more sociologists 
and political scientists in these camps than historians or geographers. Despite their 
global visions, their early debates of their epigone in the seventies and eighties 
took place in the academic world of Western universities. This exposed them, 
subsequently, to critiques by representatives of the former colonies who raised 
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their voices against the persistent Eurocentric perspectives of both dependency 
and modernization theories. 
  Initially, the modernization theorists attempted to develop a value free 
terminology and to employ ideal types in order to establish criteria for a universal 
process. Despite their best efforts, they ended up where so many of their 
predecessors had begun with a history of the world in which the West  set the 
standards for modernity and the pace for getting there. This was particularly the 
case with the American social scientists who originated the theory, by revising 
Weber.7 This innate bias also undermined efforts to apply the theory objectively to 
the third world as it was coming to be known.8 Historians sought to mitigate the 
Euro-American centrism but could not free themselves entirely from the 
methodological trap.9 Recently historians have questioned whether the concept of 
modernization has been so attenuated as to have lost its explanatory value.10  
More strongly influenced by Marx, the two most prominent advocates of 
world systems theory, Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein, enjoyed a close 
but not uncritical intellectual relationship. For Braudel, the attraction was simply that Marx's genius, the secret of his long sway, lies in the fact that he was the first 
to construct social models on the basis of a historical longue durée. 11 But he also 
found Marx too schematic, a fault he also located in Wallerstein s work. Building on 
his magisterial study, La Mediteranée, Braudel undertook to write a history of the 
world on the basis of a variation of the longue durée which he called world time.  
By this he meant a temporal scale that governs certain areas of the world but not 
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all of them. Its rhythms are set by the patterns of commercial exchange, 
communication and production for external markets. He was quick to point to the 
difference between the world economy and a world-economy (the hyphen bearing 
great weight). A world-economy was a relatively autonomous regional economy 
able to provide for most of its own needs. Such was the Mediterranean in the 16th 
century and Muscovy up to the 18th century. By contrast, the world economy 
included all human societies engaged in trade and linked by the exchange of goods. 
At the center of each world-economy great city arose. Thus, Braudel s history of 
the world began with the rise of a succession of cities as they became the focal 
point of a constantly growing market. He then paused in his headlong flight toward modernity  in order to analyze the non-European regions before taking up the 
question of the industrial revolution and the consolidation of European 
hegemony.12  
 Similarly, Wallerstein shaped his theory of world history around shifting 
centers of economic power. This led him to devise a tripartite division of the world 
into center, semi-periphery and periphery. Each component of the system 
represented a different mode of production; the group of countries belonging to 
the more advanced center exercised a strong or preponderant control over 
economies in the semi-periphery and periphery. Furthermore, he argued that the 
three modes of production were linked to and dependent upon one another, each 
contributing to the functioning of the whole. Wallerstein concluded that although 
the capitalist mode of production commenced in the region exhibiting the most 
advantage prerequisites for growth, that is, Europe, it was a world historical 
phenomenon. He attributed the persistent success of Europe as the center of 
capitalist development to the inability of the so-called world empires like the 
Chinese, Persian, Ottoman and Russia to free their economies from oppressive 
political constraints. His description of their arrested development resembled a 
reformulation of Marx s Asiatic mode of production. For Wallerstein the crucial 
moment in the emergence of Europe (the equivalent of Braudel's world-economy) 
was the failure of the Habsburg Monarchy, the dominant region in the world 
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economy in the sixteenth century, to achieve its aim of universal empire. 
Consequently, Europe avoided the fate of other world-economies where a 
monopoly of political power stifled the growth of capitalist enterprise.13  
     Third world critics on the left pounced on the idea common to both Wallerstein 
and Braudel that world history began in the sixteenth century. In their view, both 
historians had committed the cardinal error of continuing to reserve for Europe an 
exceptional position and slighting the contribution of the non-Europeans to the 
emergence of a world economy. The race was on to shatter the symbolic frontiers 
of Western civilization.  
 Such figures as the Latin American Marxist, Andre Gunder Frank, the 
Middle East historian, Janet Abu-Lughod, and the Indian economic historian, K.N. 
Chauduri, argued that by the thirteenth century, if not earlier, a multi-centric 
Eurasian system hademerged. Europe's exceptional development rested upon its 
conquest of America rather than internal structural factors. Frank suggested that 
the coming of modernity itself must be attributed to a complex economic and 
cultural interaction among several parts of Eurasia rather than the result of 
achievements by one civilization.14 Fusing his more orthodox Marxism with a post-
colonial outlook, Frank showed no mercy in criticizing Braudel and Wallerstein for 
their Eurocentric bias.15 World history was in the process of being re-focused once 
again in what some were calling, following Hodgson, Afro-Eurasian history—still 
not quite universal world history. 
Side by side with the attempt to imagine a pre-colonial world system, other 
groups of global historians who projected their universalism on the post-colonial 
world were also beginning to emerge; some of them accepted a traditional spatial 
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organization of the world based on the four continents;  others were intent on 
smashing that framework as an invention of the Enlightenment. 
More eclectic these groups of globalists were nonetheless in general 
agreement that historians should react creatively to the radical nature of change 
that characterized the period following the Second World War and accelerating in 
the 1970s. This could be done most imaginatively by shifting the concept of 
regional frontiers from a spatial and even a symbolic base to a temporal one. In 
Braudel's terms, they advocated accelerating the pace of world time  
exponentially, and distributing the effects of change more widely than ever before.  
Yet they had to admit that the rhythmic pulse of globalization has not been 
uniform. The gap between world time and local time had widened in many areas of 
the globe. They attributed this uneven distribution of progress to the striking 
imbalance in the availability and use of global products. This led them to 
demarcate a new bipartite division of the globe along north and south rather than 
east and west lines. 
The post-colonial global historians have adopted two methodologies that 
echoed those of the modernization-dependency theorists: the first was to trace 
back the processes that have been identified as global in scope as far as possible to 
their local origins. Problems immediately surfaced over selecting the key 
processes. They have been variously defined. One set consisted of communications 
technology, weapons of mass destruction, environmental problems and 
multinational corporations.16 Another set arose from the tension between world-
wide processes of unsettlement (the mobilization of peoples, things, ideas and 
images and their diffusion in space and time) and out of the often desperate efforts 
both locally (by communities of various kinds) and globally (by regimes of varying 
composition and reach) to bring them under control or, as it were, to settle them.  
They included the expansion of industrial forms of production and destruction; the 
establishment of different regimes of order ranging from empires and corporate 
forms of capitalism to anonymous trans-national practices; the course of 
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migration, first outward from Europe and now in reverse; the growth of the 
nation-state and the disillusionment with politics.17  
The second methodology was to de-center the disciplinary epistemologies 
of both history and geography on several grounds; first, by arguing that they 
represented the offspring of an invented tradition, the Enlightenment, that 
imposed a spurious unity on divergent streams of thought;18 second, by 
discounting them as hegemonic discourses that imposed Eurocentric modes of 
thought upon the rest of the world, thus denying its peoples their authentic 
voice;19 and third, most recently by claiming that the Enlightenment was not a 
European monopoly at all.20 
Another source of contention among the global historians was the use of 
sources. The post-colonial critics have also exposed the tendencies of European 
travelers to focus on their own heroic accounts and to discredit the native 
interlocutors in gathering knowledge about the non-metropolitan world.21 At this 
point, numbers of historical geographers reacted, not by retreating behind the 
battered defenses of positivism, but advancing into the battlefield itself and 
adopting the tactics of the besiegers.22 
 In the meantime, historians were beginning express reservations about the 
entire concept of global and globalization similar to the earlier critique of 
modernization as the key to world history. The cudgels were taken up by 
specialists in large regions and regional exchanges. For the student of the African 
and the Atlantic-centered economy, globalization had assumed coherence and 
direction in seeking to understand the interconnectedness of different parts of the 
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world where there was none. Instead, the argument ran, it would be more fruitful 
to analyze processes that cross borders but were not universal. 23  
It was in light of these debates that I slowly made my own way through the 
tangle of conflicting concepts about the advantages and limitations of the 
comparative approach to large scale units of comparison (states and societies) in 
particular those coterminous in time and adjacent in space that exhibited strong 
similarities but also differences in their modes of governance, cultural, social and 
institutional structures.    
 
Comparative History and the Social Sciences  
 When I moved to the University of Pennsylvania in the mid-nineteen sixties, 
these great debates were just getting under way, their advocates filling the pages 
of professional journals and organizing panels at professional meetings. At Penn I 
was again fortunate being associated with a number of colleagues who were 
committed to introducing social scientific concepts into historical studies. Among 
them were a number of scholars who had been influenced by Marx and Weber, but 
who evinced little interest in embracing world or global history. They preferred to 
apply Robert Merton s approach of middle range  theory to historical analysis. 
Originally Merton proposed a more scientific method of analysis that would 
obviate the futile search for an overarching independent variable that would 
explain all social processes yet provide a theoretical structure for purely empirical 
regularities.24 For the historian, this suggested that the optimal approach to large 
scale theorizing would seek to avoid universals like modernization and 
globalization while rejecting narratives constructed solely on the accumulation of 
empirical evidence. In practical terms this meant that comparative history could 
yield the most illuminating results by confining its methods to rigorously defined 
problems. With this in mind, I joined with Lee Benson in American history and 
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Richard D. Lambert in South Asian  Studies to launch our first interdepartmental 
faculty seminar in comparative studies by focusing on the social and political 
dimensions of multi-cultural societies, beginning with the Roman Empire and 
coming down to the United States in the twentieth century. We followed this up 
with a successful application to the Mellon Foundation for a five-year grant to Reinvigorate and Revitalize the Social Sciences.  The aim was to organize a set of 
interdisciplinary seminars that might serve as models for a reconstruction of 
university wide curricula. The seminar in which I was involved, on Technology and Culture , brought together faculty from many departments in the College 
including History, Economics, Political Science, Literature, Anthropology, and 
Sociology along with representatives from the professional schools, Engineering, 
Wharton, Annenberg School of Communications and Law.25 The ambition was 
laudable but given institutional interests and inertia probably unrealizable. While 
the experiment fell short of expectations at the university level, it did influence a 
number of faculty members to introduce interdisciplinary courses in their 
departments. 
The effect on my thinking as chair of the History Department was profound. 
I introduced a new structure for graduate training which required a 
comprehensive oral exam in two fields, the traditional subject area in history and a 
social science. As an experiment it too was probably a bridge too far.   I 
recognized that the other disciplines were not fully prepared to enter into a fruitful 
dialogue with history and accommodate our students in their discipline. What we 
would later identify as differences arising from the shift in the social sciences away 
from the classic theorists like Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Mannheim, for example, 
to model building and highly quantitative data analysis. Moreover, the institutional 
culture was not conducive to interdisciplinary cooperation at that time.  What an 
individual might aspire to, an institution would resist. However, in the History 
Department we sought to maintain a role for the social sciences in training our 
students along the lines suggested by Merton. My own contribution was a team-
taught course in Comparative Bureaucracies (Russia, France and China) with two 
                                                             
25 For the results of the seminar on Technology and Culture see the special issue of Science in 
Context, v. 8, n. 2, 1995. 
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colleagues in the department who were economic historians, Martin Wolfe for 
France and Robert Hartwell for China.  
 The next turn in the road to comparative history was for me unexpected. I 
was invited to participate in one of the first joint American-Soviet research 
seminar to emerge in late perestroika organized by Hugh Ragsdale and V.N. 
Ponomarev in Washington D.C. It produced a volume, Imperial Russian Foreign 
Policy, which by its title did not suggest a comparative approach. However, I was 
encouraged to contribute a broadly based analysis of what I called persistent factors  in Russian foreign policy that established the basis for my later research 
and writing on the comparative history of empires.26 My second contribution to 
the volume was, in fact, comparative. It was the first attempt to compare the 
literature on Russian foreign policy in five great traditions: the imperial Russian 
and Soviet, German, French, English and American.27 This exercise enabled me to 
discern the role of space and time in the evolution of scholarly thinking about 
Russian foreign policy and the explanatory power of national traditions to shape a 
vision of Russia that corresponded in many ways to the policies followed by their 
respective governments. My hope was that my emphasis of persistent as opposed 
to permanent factors would shift the argument on Russian foreign policy away 
from what I called the three myths of unlimited expansion to a more nuanced 
perception that would take into account the country s multi-cultural character, 
relative economic backwardness, cultural alienation and permeable frontiers.  But 
current thinking in the corridors of power in Europe and the United States has 
disappointed that hope.   
 When I took up my duties at the Central European University in Budapest in 
1995, I sought to implement some of the lessons I had learned about the value of 
comparative history. Undaunted by the resistance I had faced at the University of 
Pennsylvania, I devised the first graduate program for the History Department at 
CEU which was then approved and certified by the Board of Regents of the 
                                                             
26 RIEBER, Alfred. Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay. In: 
RAGSDALE, Hugh (Ed.). Imperial Russian Foreign Policy. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: 
Woodrow Wilson Center, Cambridge University, 1993. p. 315-59. 
27 RIEBER, Alfred. The Historiography of Imperial Russian Foreign Policy: A Critical Survey In: 
RAGSDALE, Hugh (Ed.). Op. Cit., p. 360-444. 
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University of State of New York and subsequently by the Middle States Commission 
on Higher Education and the Hungarian Accreditation Committee . The program 
created a tripartite organization of the faculty and curriculum based on the spatial 
and temporal imagining  of three regions, Eastern, Central, and Southeastern 
Europe in the early modern and modern period (circa 1450-present). As a 
university exclusively intended for graduate training, students would be obliged to 
select two out of the three regions for comparison in their comprehensive oral 
exam for the Master s degree. Similarly, students would also identify two of the 
regions for their oral field exam as a prerequisite for entering the doctoral 
program. The MA thesis and the doctoral dissertation were not required to have a 
comparative component; that would have prolonged the degree granting program 
beyond the resources of the university or the financial resources of the students 
who in all cases required scholarships to attend. But it was expected that the 
introduction to the theses would contain a theoretical section which would reflect 
exposure to the course work and additional reading. 
Several aims guided this program. First, it was designed to match the 
intellectual interests of the student body, which was recruited overwhelmingly 
from these regions. Second, it sought to provide a substitute and corrective to the 
ideological bias of communist higher education in the social sciences and 
humanities without embracing the opposite extreme of nationalist narratives. 
Consequently, no course was designed to deal exclusively with the history of an 
individual nation state. A required course in historiography introduced students to 
the range of approaches to history from Ranke to the present covering the most recent innovative  turns  in the writing of history from the cultural turn  to the spatial turn,  women s history, quantitative history, micro-history, and discourse 
analysis. At the doctoral level, a team-taught seminar would provide the students 
with a wide range of social science models on comparison, broadened to include the include the role of entanglements  and transfers.  I was able to strengthen 
the structural component of the program by hiring a number of recurrent visiting 
faculty from universities in Croatia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Ukraine history, all of whom were committed to new approaches to history. 
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 In the course of designing and implementing the new curriculum, the 
theoretical problem arose of delimiting the three regions. An inter-departmental 
debate was inspired by the attempt of Milan Kundera to redefine Central Europe. 
At the heart of Kundera s interpretation was his insistence that the lands between 
the German and Russian powers were distinguished by their aspiration for 
independence from both and a commitment to democratic principles.28 A number 
of Hungarian historians like István Bibó had foreshadowed this view after the 
Second World War and the first chair of the History Department at CEU, and my 
colleague Péter Hanák adapted this perspective also in his vivid recreation, tinged 
with nostalgia, of the cultural life of the Habsburg Monarchy.29 But the question 
remained of whether this noble vision could sustain the burden of explaining the 
shared and the distinctive characteristics of the three regions as we had 
alternatively identified them in our discussions. 
 An opportunity for me to explore further the problem of situating the 
tripartite set of regions in a spatial and temporal context came from Jurgen Kocka, 
the distinguished comparative historian at Berlin. He recommended me to the 
board of editors of the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral 
Sciences to contribute a piece on comparative frontiers.30 My two points of 
departure were: first, the original frontier essay of Frederick Jackson Turner as it 
had been revised by American historians over the previous century, sometimes to 
the point of refutation; second, I borrowed heavily from the still influential work of 
Owen Lattimore, which I had first encountered as an undergraduate in my 
preoccupation with extra-European history. Together with the inspiring work of 
Professor Inalcik, I constructed a comparative model of frontiers, always guided by 
                                                             
28 KUNDERA, Milan. The Tragedy of Central Europe. New York Review of Books, v. 31, n. 7, p. 33-8. 
29 BIBÓ, István. The distress [misery] of east European small states. In: NAGY, Karoly (Ed.). 
Democracy, revolution, self-determination: selected writings. Boulder, New York: Atlantic 
Research and Publications, Columbia University, 1991; SZÚCKS, Jenö. The Three Historical Regions 
of Europe. An Outline. Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungarica, v. 29, n. 2-4, p. 131-84, 
1983; HANÁK, Péter. Central Europe. A Historic Region in Modern Times. In: SCHÖPFLIN, George; 
WOOD, Nancy (Eds.). In Search of Central Europe. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1989. p. 57-
69; HANÁK, Péter. The Garden and the Workshop. Essays on the Cultural History of Vienna and 
Budapest. Princeton: Princeton University, 1998. 
30 RIEBER, Alfred. The Frontier in History. In: SMELSER, Neil; BATES, Paul (Eds.), The 
International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 9. Amsterdam, New 
York: Elsevier, 2001. p. 5812-5815. 
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Marc Bloch s counsel that the most fruitful comparisons are made between 
temporally congruent and spatially and adjacent subjects.31 The delimitation of the 
three regions would then be undertaken as a methodological and theoretical study 
of the nature of their frontiers variously conceived in cultural and political terms. 
The pedagogic task of designing and realizing a new curriculum for graduate 
studies then led me to place spatial concepts at the center of my research agenda.  
 It is well over a hundred years ago that Frederick Jackson Turner published 
his now world famous influential essay on the frontier in American history. The 
great explanatory power of his vision resided in its claim to explain the uniqueness 
of American civilization.32 Paradoxically, it also became a model for scholars 
seeking to adopt or refute its implications for a whole series of different societies 
that shared, however, the similar feature of a moving frontier. Turner s concept, 
then, still serves as the main frame of comparative approaches to frontiers in 
world history. This is not surprising. Given the large number of American 
historians and the academic culture of methodological restlessness in the U.S., it is 
no wonder that the main changes in conceptualizing the history of frontiers has 
been dominated by revisions of Turner's original thesis.33 As a result, a triptych of 
Turner iconography has emerged. Flanking one side of the central panel of the 
traditional Turner, a different spatial concept linked the rise and consolidation of 
the centralized state that developed out of the French experience as interpreted by 
the Annales School. Lucien Febvre insisted, for example, that the study of frontiers 
could only be carried out in connection with the nature of the state, which defines 
the political and military sense of the word.34  
                                                             
31 BLOCH, Marc. Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européenes. Revue de synthèse 
historique, v. 46, p. 15-50, 1925. English translation as BLOCH, Marc. Toward a Comparative 
History of European Societies. In: LANE, Frederic; RIEMERSMA, Jelle (Eds.). Enterprise and 
Secular Change: Readings in Economic History. Homewood: George Allen & Unwin, 1953. p 494-
521. 
32 TURNER, Frederick. The Significance of the Frontier in American History. In: ___. The Frontier in 
American History. New York: Hole, Rinehart & Winston, 1920. p. 1-38. 
33 A useful review of the vast literature is ADELMAN, Jeremy; ARON, Stephen. From Borderlands to 
Borders: Empires, Nation-States and the Peoples in Between in North American History. The 
American Historical Review, v. 104, n. 3, p. 814-41, 1999. 
 34 FEBVRE, Lucien. Frontière: The Word and the Concept. In: BURKE, Peter (Ed.). A New Kind of 
History from the Writings of Lucien Febvre. London: Routledge, 1973. p. 208-18. 
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 On the other side of the triptych a third panel represents the symbolic 
geographies, that is, the construction of imaginary borders on the basis of 
normative evaluations of the Other.   Explicitly or implicitly symbolic frontiers 
have been employed since ancient times to differentiate between the civilized and 
the barbarian worlds. These divisions have taken many forms since then. Some of 
them have been dualist like Europe and Asia (or Occident and Orient) others have 
been triads like the three worlds of the Cold War (the West, the Communist Bloc 
and the Third World). Such symbolic frontiers have also been enlisted to make 
finer distinctions as between western and eastern Europe or the Near East, Middle 
East and Far East. Most of these distinctions have been made by West European 
and American scholars. They have met strong resistance from those outside the 
magic Atlantist circle or else from the new disciplinary approaches in western 
scholarship. 
 It has only been in the past half-century that anthropology, sociology and 
cultural studies have widened the debate over frontiers. In the nineteen fifties, the 
anthropologists began to engage in active field work on the margins of sedentary 
and nomadic societies. Owen Lattimore, although not academically trained as an 
anthropologist, was a pioneer in this approach. So was Frederik Barth, a 
professional anthropologist, whose work took a very different direction.35 
Geographers absorbed in local and regional studies felt the influence of their 
colleagues in cultural studies. They began to redefine space and frontiers in terms 
of linguistic and social contexts.36 The so-called textual approach appealed strongly 
to non-European post-colonialist scholars who coined the term textualizing the world , meaning the mental construction of the globe and its discursive sub-
divisions to fit the European vision.37 Both sociologists and anthropologists 
                                                             
 35 LATTIMORE, Owen. Inner Asian Frontiers of China. Boston: Beacon, 1950; BARTH, Frederik. 
Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan. Oslo: Brłdrene Jłrgensen boktr., 1953; 
see also his more general work, BARTH, Frederik. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1969. The work of anthropologists was later summarized in KHAZANOV, 
Anatoly. Nomads and the Outside World. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1994 with full 
updated bibliography. 
 36 See for example, GODLEWSKA, Anne; SMITH, Neil. Geography and Empire. Blackwell: 
Blackwell, 1994 and LEWIS, Martin; WIGEN, Karen. The Myth of Continents. A Critique of 
Metageography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 
 37 SPIVAK, Gayatri. Op. Cit., p. 1-16. 
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explored ways in which ethnic identity and concepts of citizenship corresponded 
to the drawing of territorial boundaries.38 Finally semioticians like Iuri Lotman perceived frontiers as zones of cultural bilingualism. 39 The more adventurous 
historians rapidly absorbed these insights in expanding the study of frontiers. But 
it must be admitted that the first theorist of the frontiers, the American historian 
Frederick Jackson Turner was no stranger to what is now called the 
multidisciplinary approach, although in his day the term had not yet been 
invented. Nevertheless, the last decades of the twentieth century witnessed a 
virtual explosion of multidisciplinary studies of frontiers. And beyond that there 
has been a boom in the comparative study of frontiers that always seems in one 
way or another to come back to Turner, if only to attempt to refute him.  
 The historiographical triptych outlined above provides a rough guide to the 
evolution of my thinking about the ecological and cultural factors that shaped 
frontiers throughout the Eurasian land mass. I identified three basic types of 
frontiers: consolidated state frontiers; dynamic frontiers of advancing settlements 
and symbolic frontiers. To be sure, features of two or even all three of these types 
coincide with one another. In order to avoid overstressing uniformities and make 
way for diversity of historical experiences, a variety of sub-types have also been 
introduced. In all cases, I concluded frontiers should be envisaged as zones distinct 
from linear boundaries, often highly contested by two or more state systems, 
harboring communities that differ culturally (ethno-linguistically) and socially 
from the centers of power of those state systems. To be sure, boundaries may be 
embedded in frontiers and frontiers may be considered boundaries of a sort. That 
is, the political or territorial delimitation may run more or less closely to the 
features of physical geography or ethno-linguistic divisions. Or by contrast they 
may have little or no correspondence to either geography or culture but rather 
                                                             
38 BRUBAKER, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard 
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designate the limits of military conquest.40 As a sub-text, I proceeded to employ 
this comparison to construct a model of Eurasia, its frontiers and borderlands that 
I hoped would contribute to a better understand of the origins of the Cold War, and 
the symbolic invention and material construction of the Iron Curtain.  
 In retrospect, I realize that a creative tension had developed during my 
pursuit of comparative frontiers in my research and writing, on the one hand, and 
the constructive of a pedagogic program. The first was more extensive in space and 
time, extending beyond Europe in the modern period; the second was restricted to 
three regions of Europe, albeit with extra European inputs, primarily in the form of 
transfers of ideas and people. How did I seek to resolve the tension?   The answer 
emerged in the form of a project to write a history informed by a different 
dimension of space and time that surmounted the limits of a Eurocentric approach 
yet did not aspire to encompass the world. To this end I revived, revised rather 
drastically and combined three theoretical approaches to the relationship between 
history and geography.  
 One had been developed by three major German geographers of the 
nineteenth century, Carl Ritter, Friederich Ratzel and Wilhelm Humboldt.41 Their 
ideas had been reshaped subsequently, in the hands of Anglo-American publicists 
at the turn of the twentieth century into a new theory of international relations 
called geopolitics. They originated the idea that imperial Russia aspired to control 
over the Eurasian land mass that would provide the resources and strategic 
advantage necessary to achieve global hegemony. On that basis, post-World War II 
American intellectuals and government advisers re-interpreted this approach by 
inserting the ideological factor of international communism to lay the foundations 
for the containment policy.42 
                                                             
40 A stimulating study indicates that a basic distinction between frontiers which are zones of 
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 The second, in opposition to the first as it were, derived from the work of 
pioneers of the Annales School, especially Paul Vidal de la Blache, and Lucian 
Febvre. Their contribution might be called geo-cultural. The basic underlying 
assumption here is that physical geography presents possibilities as well as 
imposing constraints on human action. Avoiding the trap of geographic 
determinism, the geo-cultural approach, while granting the influence of the environment on the emergence of privileged places,  leaves ample space for the 
role of cultures, collective communities and the rationalizing actions of rulers. 43 
  The third, civilizational approach belonged originally to a small group of Russian émigrés in Prague who dubbed themselves Eurasianists.  They 
interpreted the historical role of Russia as pursuing a course of civilization-
blending between Europe and Asia to bring spiritual unity of the world.44  
 My original training in Russian history had emphasized its place in 
European history, but I now realized that different concepts of Russia s spatial 
location required integration into the history of the land mass known as Eurasia. 
Yet I was not prepared to accept this term either in its geo-political overly 
determinist interpretation or its spiritual-mystical vocation. There remained geo-
cultural approach; but the annalistes had never applied their thinking to Eurasia. I 
then faced the need to construct a new spatial imaginary, blending the physical, 
cultural and civilizational elements into a coherent whole. 
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Eurasia 
 Imagining Eurasian space required a separate set of analytical categories. 
My starting point was to locate the formative geocultural circumstances that gave 
unity to the Eurasian space. I found it in the long history of contact between 
nomadic and settled populations dating back to the earliest times when the Roman, 
Sasanian and Ming empires represented the settled agricultural societies. The main 
features of this contact required me to refine my definition of frontier types 
(consolidated state frontiers; dynamic frontiers of advancing settlements and 
symbolic frontiers) in order to emphasize their interactive (or entangled) 
relationships. For several millennia, the military superiority of the nomadic 
horseman armed with the complex bow dominated the contest for hegemony in 
Eurasia, reaching its greatest extent under the Mongol Empire and slowly declining 
thereafter. Gradually, the settled agricultural communities overcame the 
disadvantages of extended space through military innovation (the so-called 
gunpowder revolution) and advances in techniques of mobilizing human and 
financial resources for purposes of waging war.  
 By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century Eurasian space was 
mainly organized into multi-cultural states shaped by four historical processes; 
first, large scale population movements including migration and colonization 
which scattered and mixed a great variety of culture groups over vast distances; 
second the formation of stable state institutions under divinely endowed rulers, 
based on growing numbers of permanent officials (bureaucrats) and professional 
armies; third an impulse to expand beyond the original centers of power leading to 
frequent inter-state conflict, the conquest and absorption under imperial rule of 
territories on their peripheries; and fourth, the periodic eruption of internal 
struggles by subjugated peoples to maintain their cultural integrity against 
linguistic assimilation and religious conversion, preserve autonomy or regain 
independence. My conclusion then was that Eurasia as a concept, like frontiers, 
was better understood as a geographic imaginary that had to be redefined in 
spatial and temporal terms as the product of large-scale historical processes.  
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Complex Frontiers 
 Focusing on Eurasian space required a revised interpretation of frontiers. 
By limiting my comparison to the frontiers along the peripheries of the major 
contestants for supremacy in Eurasia, I identified a number of similar 
characteristics that enabled me to call them complex. The most salient features 
which distinguished them was a spatial location where: first, three or more multi-
cultural conquest states engaged over long periods of time in military conflict and 
where communities on both sides of the frontier engaged in raiding, trading and 
cultural exchange; second, official boundary lines cut across ethno-linguistic and 
religious lines of identification among the local communities; third, unstable and 
turbulent relations between the frontier communities and the centers of power 
centered on questions of assimilation and acculturation giving rise to a variety of 
survival strategies, ranging from silent resistance to outright rebellion. Finally, 
complex frontiers did not exist in isolation. Events along one of these frontiers 
could and often did resonate in other adjacent frontiers. 
 While sharing these broadly defined common characteristics, complex 
frontiers also displayed differences within regions, reflecting variations in the 
physical landscape and nature of human activities, along a broad band of territory 
stretching from the Baltic to the Sea of Okhotsk.  Employing the comparative 
method of weighing similarities and differences, I assembled seven complex 
frontiers: the Baltic Littoral, Triplex Confinium or West Balkans, Danubian Basin, 
Pontic Steppe, Caucasian Isthmus, Trans-Caspia and Inner Asia.45 Admittedly, these 
were the imaginings of an historian, rather than cartographic lines yet their 
individual characteristics enabled me to address important questions on the 
evolution of power relationships and social movements from the rise of early 
modern empires to the outbreak of the First World War.  
 The Russian Empire was involved directly in the formation and evolution of 
all the complex frontiers except the Triplex Confinium where it gradually expanded 
its indirect intervention throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
The other continental empires faced fewer complex frontiers in Eurasia — three 
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for the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, two for the Iranian and only one, Inner 
Asian, for the Qing. However, this latter group was exposed as well to direct 
contact with frontiers outside Eurasia. For them the phenomenon of what might be 
called the outer or double frontier with the imperial overseas powers of Western 
Europe, primarily France and Great Britain, immensely complicated their 
competition on their land frontiers. Even Russia was indirectly affected by the 
imperial policies of the West, although it lacked an extensive seacoast or any land 
frontier with the Western powers. 
 The complex frontiers were the sites of periodic often prolonged wars, 
accompanied by mass population movements which determined in the long term 
the relative power positions of the multicultural states in their struggle to secure 
their borderlands. The chronology of these wars falls into two periods. From the 
sixteenth to the mid-late eighteenth century the major multi-cultural states, the 
Habsburg, Russian, Ottoman, Safavid, Qing and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
were all players in the game. They still competed on more or less equal terms and 
continue to enjoy moments of revival and expansion. Thereafter, the balance began 
to tilt in favor of a Russian ascendency which, while not uniform or unbroken, 
continued to the last decades of the nineteenth century. At the same time, changes 
were taking place within the frontier communities. Among some the tendency was 
to assimilate; among other a tendency was to seek unity with their brethren across 
the boundary line or within their borderland on the basis of autonomy. The 
impulse for autonomy was not yet infused with nationalist sentiments; that was 
only to come during the nineteenth century and more gradually than many 
nationalist historians are willing to admit.  Throughout both periods, attempts to 
fix boundaries through international treaties failed to stabilize them, prolonging 
the formation of nation-states. Porous and contested frontiers remained a 
disruptive element not only in the relations among states but also between the 
imperial centers of power and the borderlands. The cataclysm of World War I did 
not resolve but in some ways intensified the problems spawned by complex 
frontiers in the struggle over the borderlands in its post-imperial phase. 
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Borderlands 
 To complete an analysis of the conceptualization of space in geo-cultural 
terms it remained to fit the borderlands into the general schema. Conquest 
Eurasian empires, competing for space and seeking security, carved out of their 
frontiers and incorporated into their imperial system as separate administrative 
units, sometimes enjoying a degree of autonomy, territories of different and varied 
cultural composition which may be called borderlands. The five major Eurasian 
empires displayed over the course of their existence similar patterns in the 
location of their borderlands. The titular population at the center of power was 
encircled by territories inhabited by different ethno-linguistic groups. For example, 
the periphery of the Russian Empire at its height was composed of territories 
inhabited by Finns, Poles, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Kazakh Turcoman, 
and Siberian tribes. Similarly, the borderlands of China were peopled by Manchus, 
Mongols, to the north, Uighurs and other Turkic peoples to the west and tribes in 
Yunnan to the southwest.  
   The incorporation of a borderland into a multi-cultural state did not mean the 
end of the struggle over its political or cultural identity. Instead, it continued to be 
the object of struggles played out on two levels: externally with rival states and 
internally with the conquered peoples. Thus, borderlands faced frontiers in two 
directions; an inner cultural frontier turned toward the center of state power and 
an outer, inherently unstable military frontier facing territories contested by rival 
powers.46 The web of relationships between borderlands and the core was highly 
complex and underwent extensive changes over time. If the Eurasian Empires 
were the objects of an Orientalist gaze from the West, then it is also true that they 
shared an Orientalist (or barbarian  perception of their own borderlands as 
culturally inferior or incapable of governing themselves.47  
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  Logically, the term borderland implies the existence of a core. Paradoxically, 
it is more difficult to arrive at a satisfactory spatial definition of core than it is of 
borderlands. In line with the geo-cultural approach core may be defined as a space 
shaped by the exercise and symbolic display of power. Its main components were 
the ruler, the court, the army command, the administrative offices and the main 
residences of the ruling elite. 
 In all these cases, the acquisition of borderlands was a prolonged and 
uneven process; their attachment was never secure; in the case of the Ottomans 
especially there was a constant loss of the borderlands after the late seventeenth 
century (the Great Morean War).  All the empires lost many or most of their 
borderlands from 1914 to 1920 with partial and temporary recovery in the case of 
the Soviet Union and full recovery for China. 
 
The Trilogy  
 Working out the implications of these comparative spatial concepts for the 
rise and demise of the multicultural empires was the challenge that led me to the 
idea of three volumes that would examine key aspects of the struggle for 
hegemony in Eurasia from the rise of the early modern empires to the Second 
World War.  
 The first book in the trilogy on the struggle for supremacy in Eurasia 
between the Russian, Habsburg, Ottoman, Safavid-Qajar and Qing Empires was 
constructed around the three foci of my teaching and research on comparative 
history: the nature of imperial rule, the interaction (or entanglement) of empires 
along complex frontiers, the formation of borderlands and their relationship to the 
centers of imperial power.48 
 The nature of imperial rule focused on three fundamental elements: the 
political religion of imperial ideologies; imperial bureaucracies and imperial armed 
forces. In delineating five complex frontiers (Baltic Littoral, West Balkans, Pontic 
Steppe, South Caucasus and Inner Asia), I sought to characterize them as shifting, 
military, multi-cultural, overlapping and interactive. The borderlands that emerged 
                                                             
48 RIEBER, Alfred. The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands. From the Rise of Early Modern 
Empires to the End of the First World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2014. 
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from the inter-imperial conflicts along these frontiers were variously incorporated 
under imperial rule but never fully integrated. The tension between the 
borderlands and center revolved around linguistic, confessional, economic and 
broadly cultural issues. By the turn of the twentieth century, serious crises were 
breaking out in all the five empires. The impact of World War challenged the 
capacity of imperial rule to survive and ultimately brought them all down. Their 
destruction, however, left unresolved questions with which their successor states 
were forced to confront. 
   The aim of the second volume in the trilogy, Stalin and the Struggle for Eurasia, 
was to demonstrate how the Soviet Union revived many features of imperial rule 
enveloped in a radically transformed ideology and continued to be engaged in a 
struggle along its frontiers with the successors states, which had been imperial 
borderlands like Finland, or parts thereof like West Belorussia, West Ukraine 
(Eastern Poland) and Bessarabia.  Under Stalin the idea of world revolution 
became transformed into a re-creation of imperial rule not only over former 
borderlands but expanded in a series of concentric circles of control into Eastern 
Europe and the Chinese borderlands of Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang.49 
 
Region 
The third volume, now in the process of publication, The Adriatic: Clash of 
Imperial Visions during the Second World War, shifts the focus to one complex 
frontier (Western Balkans) which I re-conceptualized as a region in order to bring 
a different set of problems into bolder relief. The spatial imaginary of region has, 
like frontiers, stimulated a long debate. I have been guided, once again, by insights 
from the annalistes who to cite Lucien Fevre have argued that what is important is 
not to define the region per se, that is, in terms of its physical dimensions) but the 
questions one asks— le problematique —about its historical significance.50 Three 
questions shaped my approach to the Adriatic region. First, how is it possible to 
                                                             
49 RIEBER, Alfred. Stalin and the Struggle for Supremacy in Eurasia. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 2015. 
50 FEBRVE, Lucien. La terre et l’évolution humaine. Introduction géographique à l histoire. Paris: 
A. Michel [1922], 1970. For a similar sentiment see Febvre s companion in arms, Marc Bloch; unity 
of place is a confused idea; only unity of the problem is central.  BLOCH, Marc. Annales d’histoire 
économique et social, v. 6, p. 81, 1934. 
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understand the recurrent conflicts over centuries between multiple great powers 
pursuing imperial interests and among the diverse and shifting populations in a 
field of struggle that centered on the Adriatic Sea and spread into its hinterlands? 
Second why did these conflicts reach a climax during the Second World War, 
plunging the region into a cauldron of violence and spawning bitter collective 
memories that continue to divide and haunt its people down to the present day? 
And finally, why did every one of the competing powers fail to impose its political 
or cultural hegemony over the region? 
 Addressing these questions, third volume in the trilogy seeks first to 
identify long term historical processes which I argue provided the Adriatic with its 
unique regional character. These were the nature of warfare, mixing conventional 
with irregular, low level fighting infused with religious elements; mass population 
movements including migration, colonization, flight and resettlement; and the 
prolonged and incomplete process of state-building. Second, the book 
demonstrates how these processes reaching a climax in the trauma of the First 
World War, depositing a legacy of unresolved problems that deeply affected the 
societies and institutions of the successor states. As a result, in the decades 
preceding and during the Second World War, radical visions of social and political 
change fueled a renewed struggle for hegemony in the region. The men and 
policies embodying these visions form the themes of the book. By vision is meant a 
transformative idea projected into an indeterminate but not unattainable future, 
combined with a will, an energy, and a capacity to achieve its aims through action. 
In the post-First World War period, new leaders emerged outside the traditional 
elites to fashion these radical visions and lead their followers into a ferocious 
struggle during the Second World War. Mussolini, Hitler, Tito and Stalin embodied 
elements of previous imperial rule but manipulated them through a discursive 
style and mass mobilization that incited violent transformation of institutions and 
social arrangements. My preference for the term vision as an object of 
contemplative imagination and derivative action stems from a search for a more 
complex explanatory formula than those limited to ideological, geopolitical or 
other mono-causal factors and to avoid the often sterile debates of over whether 
one or the other of these factors was preponderant in policy making. Vision 
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combines an appreciation of the interplay among all these factors as fashioned by 
the new leaders. 
The fulfillment of imperial visions fueled the drive for hegemony by one 
dominant social group over others in the process of expanding or reconstructing a 
state. This process has often acquired the descriptive term of ethnic cleansing or 
class war which may at times be imprecise. It could mean deportation or 
extermination; but it could also mean forced cultural assimilation. In the Adriatic 
region there were examples of both.  
During the Second World War, the clash of imperial visions in the Adriatic 
region exhibited several unique features. Nowhere else in Europe did Italian 
fascism, Nazi racism, Soviet communism and integral nationalism engaged with 
one another in conventional, irregular and civil wars; nowhere else did civil wars 
take the extreme forms of inter-communal violence and killings.51 In an epilogue I 
suggest that the destructive effects of this paroxysm contributed to the failure of 
the imperial vision of the Soviet Union in the region and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
and the current crisis in the region. 
 In retracing the steps of my odyssey, I conclude that there was no 
predetermined pattern, as there is none in historical processes. There were always 
choices to be made; paths not taken. Yet there were also predispositions, 
inclinations, suggesting that there was a high degree of probability in my following 
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